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ABSTRACT 
The study’s focus was on assessing performance of the beneficiaries of the rescue 
package (cotton and coffee traders’) following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) that 
occurred in 2008. It aimed at analyzing the characteristics of rescue package 
beneficiaries, assessing their performance after they had received the rescue package 
and identifying factors influencing such performance. Data were collected by 
administering 74 questionnaires to sampled beneficiaries in Ruvuma, Mbeya, 
Mwanza, Mara and Shinyanga. Only 51 useful questionnaires were returned.  
 
Data were inputted in SPSS Software. The analysis involved use of cross tabulation 
techniques to analyze the key characteristics of rescue package beneficiaries and 
assessing their performance after they had received the rescue package. Also 
identifying the factors that influenced loan repayment performance and access loans, 
mean scores from 5 points likert scale types of statement were computed 
descriptively across respondents and compared statistically between coffee and 
cotton traders using independent samples t-test technique. 
 
Results show that 31.3% of the rescue package beneficiaries repaid their loans fully, 
78.4% accessed loans subsequently; 52.9% experienced increase in sales varying 
from 1% to 100%, 39.2% increased staffing by between 1% to 100%; and 74.5% 
were able to survive and continue trade in the two crops. There were notable 
differences in all performance measurements between coffee and cotton traders. 
Multiple borrowing behaviour of the traders, political interference, interest rate on 
loans and crop market were found to be important determinants of rescue package 
beneficiaries’ subsequently loan repayment performance. Mean scores for multiple 
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borrowing and political interference for coffee traders were statistically significantly 
higher than those of cotton traders. Moreover, although crop prices and crop markets 
had the lowest mean scores, those for coffee traders were statistically higher than 
those of cotton traders and were significant. 
 
Result also show that bank procedures, timeliness disbursement, bank policies, 
timeliness of disbursement of rescue package payments and traders relationship with 
the bank were important factors for subsequent access to loans. Mean scores for all 
these factors were lower and statistically insignificant for coffee traders except for 
the traders’ relationship with the bank in which the mean score for coffee traders was 
significantly higher than that of cotton traders.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Research Problem 
This research assessed the performance and determinants of rescue package 
beneficiaries, analysed their key characteristics and identified the factors that 
influenced the performance of the pertinent beneficiaries after receiving the rescue 
package. 
 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) resulted from USA subprime mortgage crisis that 
began in 2006. Its effects constricted credit globally and led to the failure of several 
major financial institutions. The factors that contributed to the severity of the crisis 
included policies which encouraged mortgage financing to beneficiaries who 
arguably didn’t qualify for the facility. Eventually, distorting the relationship 
between the financing part and the mortgage customers leaving mortgage financers 
with less incentive to pay attention to whether borrowers would be able to repay their 
loans. Also there were ‘financial engineering’ practices that allowed for extremely 
low interest loans or even no interest at all which eventually led a sharp price drops 
and a glut of new homes that eventually led to sharp price drop (Shiller, 2008). 
 
The impact of GFC was on the global commodity market, for example up to July 
2009, world prices for agricultural recorded mixed trends.  Prices of Robusta and 
Arabica coffee recorded a decline from $2.28 per kg in July 2008 to $1.87 in July 
2009, and from $3.08 per kg to $2.17, respectively. The price of cotton (A index) 
decreased from $1.64 per kg to $1.41 per kg (Lunogelo, et al, 2009:4). As the GFC 
became severe worldwide, many countries took a wide range of measures to mitigate 
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its impact. Such measures include injecting public capital in easing monetary policy 
stances and providing fiscal stimulus packages (BOT, 2010) 
 
The Tanzania’s economy was not spared of this turmoil. The impact of the GFC on 
the Tanzania’s economy could be looked into from two perspectives. First, Its impact 
was on financial sector and second, its impact on the performance of the economy. 
By early 2009, there were already indications that the crisis had adversely affected a 
number of sectors including agriculture. For example, as exporters of the major 
traditional crops particularly cotton and coffee-were preparing to export their stock 
of crops in the 2009 season, world commodity prices dropped sharply because of the 
collapse in demand from major trading partners leading to cancellation of orders.  
 
The situation forced some of these exporters to sell their stocks at a loss, jeopardizing 
their ability to service loans they had obtained from commercial banks. Some of 
these exporters suspended crop buying operations and consequently many farmers 
were left with unsold crops. ‘Commercial banks therefore became vulnerable to the 
credit risk exposure due to the distressed borrowers (the crop traders) and as a result 
they became overly cautious at lending to economic activities, particularly those with 
external linkages’ (BOT, 2010:7-8). It was therefore estimated that by May 2009, 
Tanzania Government had suffered a loss of about USD 255 Million from domestic 
income occasioned by the GFC. 
 
‘Tanzania is one of eight countries that received GFC funds of more than USD 255 
Million’ (Lunogelo, et al, 2009:22). In the view of the need to cushion her economy 
from the pullovers of the GFC, the government of the United Republic of Tanzania 
(URT) prepared a rescue package as a fiscal stimulus, which was factored into the 
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2009/10 budget and it amounted to 1,692.5 billion shillings. The package was 
announced on the 9
th
 of June 2009 and was aimed at compensating for losses 
incurred on the export market and guarantees for rescheduling of loans given by 
commercial banks to cooperatives, enterprises, and companies and for procurement 
of crops among others (MOFE, 2010:3). Its key objectives included: (i) to protect 
employment and income levels of the population; (ii) to ensure food security; (iii) to 
protect key investments especially in infrastructure; and (iv) to protect social services 
programmes. Specifically, the package contained measures to stimulate domestic 
demand and targeted financial support to the affected activities in the agricultural 
sector (BOT, 2010). 
1.2 Overview of CRDB Bank PLC in Facilitating the Rescue Package 
CRDB Bank Plc is one of the leading commercial banks in Tanzania and it is listed 
on the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE) since 2009. Its history dates back to 
1947 when the Government of Tanganyika established the Land Bank of Tanganyika 
(LBT) with a capital of 4 million Tanzanian shillings (TZS) at that time. This was 
raised to 6 Million Tanzanian shillings in 1950. It went on to become the Tanzanian 
Rural Development Bank (TRDB) and eventually Corporate and Rural Development 
Bank (CRDB) in the post independence period. Following its restructuring in 1996 it 
became CRDB Bank Ltd. It took over the non performing loans (NPLs) from its 
predecessor (Corporate and Rural Development Bank) worthing TZS 52,351 Million 
which were charged off. This measure allowed CRDB Bank Ltd to start with clean 
books of accounts (CRDB, 1996). The bank’s loan portfolio included a substantial 
component of loans advanced to the agriculture sector. For example the agricultural 
sector loan component was TZS 110.899 Billion by 31
st
 December 2008 and 
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increased by an additional TZS 19.14 Billion by 31
st
 December 2009. The same 
component accounted for 28% of the loan portfolio of TZS 1.123 Trillion by 31
st
 
December 2010 (CRDB Bank PLC annual Financial Statement, 2008; 2009; 2010). 
 
Amongst the borrowers of CRDB Bank Ltd were crop traders dealing with cotton 
and coffee and these traders were also affected by the GFC from 2008 leading to 
failure to service their loans from the bank. ‘CRDB reported a total of TZS 168 
Billion which were at risk due to persistence of such failure’’ ( Lunogelo, et al, 
2009:9). Following the set up of rescue package in 2009, the Government of 
Tanzania announced to all sectors which were affected by GFC to submit their 
application letters for rescue packages, with explanation of how much each had been 
affected, to BOT for scrutiny. CRDB Bank Plc had extended loans to 155 crop 
traders in both cotton and coffee. The Bank prepared a list of all crop traders and 
informed them about the government’s announcement. 
 
BOT developed loss compensation of TZS 28.6386billion. However after a review, 
TZS 26.97086 billion was established as eligible for compensation. By march 2010, 
a total of TZs 19.313 billion had been disbursed to the traders (TZS 9.313 billion for 
cotton traders and TZS 9.867 billion for coffee traders) (MOFE, 2010:3). Out of that 
amount, TZS 18.283 billion was given to CRDB Bank Plc – TZS 8.968 billion for 
cotton traders and TZS 9.315 billion for coffee traders. Amongst the beneficiaries 
were cooperative unions, Agricultural Marketing Cooperative Societies (AMCOS), 
farmer groups and companies (BOT, 2009). A total of 155 crop traders from CRDB 
Bank Plc applied for the package (29 cotton and 126 coffee traders). Out of these, a 
total of 74 traders (14 out of 29 cotton traders and 60 out of the 126 coffee traders) 
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qualified for the package. While the coffee traders were found in Ruvuma and 
Mbeya regions, cotton traders were found in Mwanza, Shinyanga and Mara regions. 
To date only 78 crop traders (63 for coffee and 15 for cotton) are on the CRDB Bank 
Plc books. This means that 77 crop traders (63 for coffee and 14 for cotton) are either 
no longer trading in these two crops or they do it under different arrangements. 
 
To implement the package, the Government of Tanzania signed a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) with CRDB that all crop traders who received rescue package 
should continue accessing loans for five years consecutively in order to safeguard 
cash crops. By early August 2009 rescue package was disbursed to the qualified crop 
traders (CRDB Bank Plc, 2009). The modality of disbursement was clear since BOT 
prepared and submitted a list of qualified crop traders with their respective rescue 
amount to CRDB Bank PLC. Those amounts were then deposited directly to crop 
traders’ loan accounts with CRDB. 
1.3 Statement of the Research Problem 
It is now over five years 2008 – 2012 since occurrence of GFC and over four years 
since rescue package was implemented and relatively little is known about how the 
beneficiaries of the package (crop traders) performed in relation to the package’s 
main objectives. It is known already that 77 crop traders no longer do business under 
the arrangement but little is known about how all traders performed over the review 
period and more so what factors influenced their performance in addition to 
receiving the rescue package.  It would be recalled that the objectives of the rescue 
package included (i) To protect employment and income levels of the population (ii) 
to ensure food security (iii) to protect key investments especially in infrastructure 
and (iv) to protect social services programmes. It is assumed that if the rescue 
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package attained its goals the crop traders would still be in business contributing to 
these four objectives by injecting social and economic capital through sustainable 
markets for crops produced. Crop traders would also be able to service their loans 
with CRDB Bank PLC and continue to enjoy subsequent loans due to improved 
credit status. 
 
Thus, this study was designed to identify some key characteristics of the crop traders, 
determine their performance following the receipt of the rescue package and identify 
factors other than rescue package that can explain the observed performance.  
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
1.4.1 General Research Objective 
The general research objective is to assess the performance of beneficiaries of rescue 
package following GFC and its determinants. 
1.4.2 Specific Research Objectives 
The research will therefore: 
i. Analyse the key characteristics of Rescue Package Beneficiaries. 
ii. Assess the performance of Recipients of the Rescue Packages. 
iii. Identify factors influencing Rescue Package Beneficiaries’ performance. 
1.5 Research Questions 
i. What are the key characteristics of Rescue Package Beneficiaries? 
ii. How did the Recipients of Rescue Packages performed subsequently? 
iii. What factors affected Rescue Package beneficiaries’ performance? 
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1.6 Limitations  
As with many researches, there are number of limitations. The study covers crop 
traders based in Mwanza, Shinyanga, Mara, Mbeya and Ruvuma regions from only 
one Bank; therefore the results may not be generalized as Banks may not be the same 
across all over. Also respondents might not provide genuine information, as 
information could can’t be easily crosscheck. Despite of these limitations it was 
worthwhile carrying out the study because it will give insights on how rescue 
package beneficiaries performed after receiving rescue package. 
 
Significance of the Research  
This research is very important to inform the public at large on the extent to which 
the objectives of the rescue package were achieved as well as its determinants. Also 
it serves as a body of knowledge to the academic institutions particularly in the area 
of success and failures of the rescue packages as a mitigation against potential effect 
of economic downturns. Finding, on the factors that influenced performances are 
useful in planning for packages should similar crisis happen.  
 
1.8 Organization of the Dissertation 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: chapter two presents a review 
related literature and specifies the conceptual framework. Chapter three presents the 
methodology used. Chapter four presents the findings and their discussion. Finally, 
chapter five presents conclusions, implications and recommendations. Areas for 
future studies are also detailed. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Overview 
This section reviews the relevant literature. The literature review is critical in any 
research work (Kothari, 2007 cited by Kosia, 2012). The literature review  is 
organized in six main headings, namely conceptual definitions, theoretical review, 
analysis of relevant empirical studies, research gap, conceptual framework and 
conceptual framework. 
2.2 Conceptual Definitions 
2.2.1 Financial Rescue Package 
Financial rescue package is an act of loaning or giving capital to an entity (a 
company, a country or an individual) that is in danger of failing, in an attempt to save 
it from bankruptcy, insolvency or total liquidation it limit the damage that follows 
financial crises by reassuring private investors and ruin; or by allowing a failing 
entity to fail gracefully without spreading contagion. (www.wikipedia/en/math). 
Dooley, (2003:3) argues that rescue package can systematically mitigate output 
losses but only under very stringent conditions that are designed to limiting 
contagion to other countries. 
 
2.2.2 Loan 
A loan is a type of debt. Like all debt instruments, a loan entails the redistribution of 
financial assets over time, between the lender and the borrower. In a loan, the 
borrower initially receives or borrows an amount of money, called the Principal, 
from the lender, and is obligated to pay back or repay an equal amount of money 
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indeed, plus interest and other charges such application, legal and insurance fees to 
the lender at a later time. Typically, the money is paid back in regular instalments or 
partial repayments; in annuity, each instalment is the same amount 
(www.investopedia.com/terms/s/loan-servicing). Rahman, (2011:37) argues that 
traditionally, a bank gives emphasis on collateral in funding  the clients whereas in 
the concept of modern banking a bank keenly fails to measure the business risk over 
the security risk for ensuring the timely repayment of invested fund. 
2.2.3 Loan Servicing 
Loan servicing is the administration aspect of a loan from the time the proceeds are 
dispersed until the loan is paid off. This includes collecting payments and providing 
of payment statement on monthly basis, maintaining records of payments and 
remitting fund to the note holder and following up on delinquencies 
(www.investopedia.com/terms/s/loan-servicing). 
2.2.4 Performing Loan  
Performing loan is a loan on which payments of interest and principal are less than 
90 days past due (www. BusinessDictionary.com). 
2.2.5 Loan Repayment  
Loan repayment is the fully amortising payment in which each monthly rate has the 
same value over time (www.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/math). 
2.3 Theoretical Review  
The GFC has inspired writings from many scholars since 2008. The orientation 
provided in their different writings varies widely. Indeed, while some focused on the 
causes of the financial crisis, others have tried to assess its impact and recommended 
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solution.  Stimulus packages of economic measures put together by Government to 
stimulate a floundering economy was among such recommended measures. The 
objective of a stimulus package was to reinvigorate the economy and prevent or 
reverse a recession by boosting employment and spending. The theory behind the 
usefulness of stimulus package is rooted in Keynesian economics, which argues that 
the impact of a recession can be lessened with increased Government spending.  
Keynesian Economic theory states that active government intervention in the market 
place and monetary policy is the best method of ensuring economic growth and 
stability (www.investopedia.com/terms/s/stimulus-package.asp). A supporter of 
Keynesian economic believes it is the government’s job to smooth out the bumps in 
business cycles. Intervention would come in the form of Government spending and 
tax breaks in order to stimulate the economy and government spending cuts and tax 
hikes in good times, in order to curb inflation.  
 
2.4 Empirical Analysis of Relevant Studies 
Evidences from literature shows that the GFC has been referred to as the worst 
scenario since Great Depression of the 1930s. It has contributed to the failure of key 
businesses; to the decline in consumer wealth estimated in trillions of U.S. dollars; 
and triggered a significant decline in economic activities as well as prompted 
substantial financial commitments by the governments (Lunogelo, et al., 2009). 
Literature supports the fact that the impact of GFC varies from one country to the 
other (Agbetsiafa, 2011). Each government seemed to respond to the emerging 
problems with a country specific set of measures (Belke, 2009:42). Others argue that  
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there is limited scope for government to respond to this in the short term (Bevan, 
2010:29). G20 is contributed the most of the global stimulus (Khatiwada, 2009:1). 
Massa and Te Velde (2008:17) indicated that Ghana, Mali, Mozambique and 
Tanzania were more at risk than the other countries since they have a significant 
share of foreign owned banks and their economies strongly rely on foreign direct 
investment. 
 
Credit risk is the major risk in banking risk and yet almost all banks derive a 
significant proportion of their income from lending operation (Sood, 1994 cited by 
Makwi 2007). Orebiyi (2002) argues that major loan repayment determinants of rural 
borrowers in the rural credit markets of Imo State, Nigeria include the amount of 
loan borrowed, age, literacy level of the loan beneficiaries and level of the loan 
supervision. Makwi (2007) observes that for credits to perform better, the banks must 
enhance credit processing, supervision, monitoring and well established customer-
banking relationship. Mlabwa (2004) argues that lending business in banks is 
important therefore, monitoring, control and mitigation of credit risks should be 
done.  
 
One of the most common ways of mitigating credit risk is to have all loans with 
adequate securities, but even where the credit facilities are adequately secured, bank 
fail to recover the entire outstanding balance in case of default. Josiah (2009) shows 
that bank loan default among beneficiaries of credit guarantee schemes is caused by 
various factors, the most important factors are fund diversion, the will to default and 
variability in income from agricultural enterprises. 
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Joy et al (2008) after correlation analysis between group performance and social 
economic characters has revealed that management –orientation has a positive and 
significant influence on all the determinants of group performance, followed by 
information seeking behaviour, knowledge about processing, market perception and 
economic motivation. 
2.5 Research Gap Identified 
Various researchers have put forward the causes of GFC, its impacts and its 
suggested solutions. However none has focused much on the performance of 
beneficiaries of Rescue Package, during and after the GFC and Its trickle down 
effects to Tanzania Commercial Banks                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
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2.6 Conceptual Framework  
Figure 2.1 shows the objectives of rescue package to its beneficiaries. 
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Figure 2.1 Conceptual Framework 
Source: Developed by the researcher from synthesizing literature and experience. 
CHAPTER THREE 
3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Overview 
This chapter presents detailed research methodology employed in the study. The 
chapter is divided into nine sections namely are research strategies, survey 
population, area of the research, sample size, sampling frame and procedures, 
variables and measures procedures, method of data collection, data processing and 
data analysis. 
3.2 Research Strategies 
The study used a case survey strategy. A list of 74 crop traders who received rescue 
package was established with their locations. Questionnaires were used to collect 
primary data from them. Since crop traders were in form of AMCOS, Cooperatives, 
farmers groups and Limited Companies, questionnaires were administered by 
distributing them to branches and filled by leaders of each crop traders.  
 
3.2.1 Survey Population 
Total population was 155 crop traders. However, the Survey population included all 
cotton and coffee traders who were CRDB customers during GFC at the end of year 
2008, qualified and actually received the rescue package fund. In total there were 74 
crop traders (14 cotton traders and 60 coffee traders).  
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3.2.2 Area of the Research  
The study area included the regions with cotton and coffee traders were obtained the 
Rescue Packages following GFC through CRDB. Such areas included Mwanza, 
Shinyanga, Mara, Ruvuma and Mbeya regions. 
3.2.3 Sample Size and Sampling  
Considering the size and scatter of survey population as well as the potential 
response rates, it was decided to include all 74 cotton and coffee traders in a study. 
The study targeted trade leaders. The distribution of the crop traders was as follows 
Mwanza-5, Mara-1, Shinyanga-8, Mbeya-50 and Ruvuma-10. However only 51 
useful questionnaires were returned. These responses are distributed in table 3.1. 
Response rate varied from 60% to 100% depending on the region. Overall response 
rate was about 69% of all questionnaires. 
 
Table 3.1: Response Rate 
Region Crop Sampled Returned Percentage 
Mwanza Cotton 5 4 80 
Shinyanga Cotton 8 6 75 
Mbeya Coffee 50 30 60 
Ruvuma Coffee 10 10 100 
Mara Cotton 1 1 100 
Source: Researcher (2013) 
3.3 Variables and Measurement Procedures 
The key characteristics explored in the study included business entity, region of 
operation, crop specialization, assets owned, market channel, organization size (by 
asset value), organization ownership, business experience and managements’ level of 
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education(CEO and Board’s chairman). Performance indicators’ were used; namely 
crop traders’ ability to repay subsequent, sales turnover, change in loans, number of 
loan cycles completed after receiving the package and percentage increases in such 
performance measures such as sales turnover, number of staff, asset value and 
business continuity.  
 
To identify factors other than rescue package respondents were asked to indicate the 
extent to which they agree/ disagree with selected statements. The nine statements 
were: price of crops in the world market affected their ability to service loans, 
interest rates affected the same, also owned assets, political interference, crop 
markets, loan size, crop traders experience, sales turnover and multiple borrowings. 
To  assess factors that affected crop traders’ continuity in accessing loans, 
respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed to six suggested 
statements. This statement includes crop trader’s credit history, collaterals, bank 
policies, bank procedures, relationship with the bank and timely disbursements. They 
were to rate from strongly agree to strongly disagree by ticking appropriate boxes. 
 
3.4 Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire was divided into three main parts. Key characteristics were 
collected through closed ended questions (part A). Performance indicators were also 
collected using closed ended questions (part B). For performance factors the 
questionnaire contained nine statements, soliciting respondents’ opinion in Likert 
style rating scale. This was complemented with an open space for them to add any 
other factors not predicted by the nine statements. Similarly the same (but six 
statements) was done for factors that affected the respondents’ continuity (part C). 
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3.5 Data Processing and Analysis  
At the end of data collection, all completed questionnaires from the borrowers were 
thoroughly examined by the researcher, coded and inputted into computer data sheet 
using Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) software. This was followed by 
actual analysis of data in order to answer the research questions. The analysis 
involved use of cross tabulation techniques to analyze both the key characteristics of 
rescue package beneficiaries and assessing their performance after they had received 
the rescue package. Also identifying the factors that influenced loan repayment 
performance and access loans, mean scores from 5 points likert scale types of 
statement were computed descriptively across respondents and compared statistically 
between coffee and cotton traders using independent samples t-test technique. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
4.1 Overview 
This chapter presents the findings and discussions in a manner that answers the study 
questions. The study administered 74 questionnaires and only 51 were returned. 
Section 4.2 details their key characteristics, section 4.3 details performance of rescue 
package beneficiaries. Finally section 4.4 presents the factors that influenced 
performance i.e. loan repayment and continued access to loans and subsequent to 
receiving the rescue package payments.  
4.2 Key Characteristics of Rescue Package Beneficiaries 
This part describes the key characteristics of cotton and coffee traders involved in the 
study. It explains characteristics like the nature of their business entity, operating 
regions of the coffee and cotton traders, assets owned by the organizations, the nature 
of market channels, size of the organizations in terms of the asset value currently and 
organization ownership. Other characteristics include time in which the organizations 
have been in operation since their inception, the educational level of CEO of 
organization as well as chairman of the board of company/ organization. 
4.2.1 Nature of Business Entity 
The coffee and cotton traders usually conduct their business activities in various 
agreements depending on their policy, production and selling strategies while some 
are registered companies others are organized as cooperatives, Agriculture Marketing 
Cooperative Societies and farmers groups. Distribution of crop traders in these 
groups is presented in a Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Respondents Nature of Business Entity 
 Business entity Coffee Cotton Total Percentage 
 Farmers group 22 0 22 43.1 
 AMCOS 4 3 7 13.7 
 Cooperatives 5 1 6 11.8 
 Company 9 7 16 31.4 
 Total 40 11 51 100.0 
Source: Field Data (2013) 
 
About 43.1% of the respondents were doing crop trade activities as Farmers groups, 
all are coffee traders. On the other hand, about 31.4% respondents were Companies. 
This category represents 9 for coffee and 7 for cotton the second largest group of 
respondents.  Also AMCOS and Cooperatives were accounted for 13.7% and 11.8% 
of respondents respectively. These finding implies that business entities which were 
involved in the rescue package were mostly farmers group and Companies with all 
farmers’ groups dealing with coffee trading.  
4.2.2 Operating Regions 
Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of respondent beneficiaries. It shows that the 
regions involved were Mbeya, Ruvuma, Mwanza, Shinyanga and Mara region. 
Mbeya contributed 58.8% which is more than half of all respondents. The higher 
percentage of respondents from Mbeya is explained by the high number of coffee 
traders who obtained their bank services from CRDB Bank Plc. Since the study 
involves the cotton and coffee traders who were servicing their loans from CRDB 
Bank Plc and have quite a history in terms of their bank service (includes loans and 
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advice), Mbeya is among the regions in Tanzania which was severely affected by the 
GFC. Also about 19.6% of respondents in the study were from Ruvuma region while 
11.8% were from Shinyanga region. The small percentage is explained by the low 
response rate which was 32% and 18% for Shinyanga and Ruvuma, respectively. 
Mara region had the lowest respondents in the study with only 2%. 
 
Table 4.2: Operating Regions 
 Region Coffee Cotton Total Percentage 
 Mbeya 30 0 30 58.8 
 Mwanza 0 4 4 7.8 
 Ruvuma 10 0 10 19.6 
 Shinyanga 0 6 6 11.8 
 Mara 0 1 1 2.0 
 Total 40 
(78.4%) 
11 
(21.6%) 
51 
(100) 
100 
Source: Field Data (2013) 
 
4.2.3 Respondents’ Distribution Per Crop 
Table 4.2 shows the distribution of beneficiaries per crops traded and across the 
regions. About 78.4% of crops traders were involved with coffee trade while 21.6% 
were involved with cotton trade. The results show that more coffee’s traders got 
rescue package through CRDB Bank Plc compared to cotton’s traders. Furthermore, 
Table 4.2 shows that all coffee traders came from Mbeya (75%) and Ruvuma (25%). 
Both regions are located within Southern Highland where there is favourable climate 
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for coffee production. On the other hand, cotton traders are shown on Table 4.2. 
Shinyanga (54.5%), Mwanza (36.4%) and Mara (9.1 %.). Again the distribution 
bears on climatic condition in these regions which favour cotton production. 
 
4.2.4 Organization Assets 
The rescue package provided by the Tanzania government was aimed at making the 
beneficiaries withstand the financial downfall caused by the GFC in such a way that 
they would continue with their businesses and market operations as usual.  Thus, the 
study also wanted to determine the kind of assets these crop traders had accumulated 
over the years as a proxy for financial stability. Results are represented in Table 4.4. 
The results show that about 41.2% of the respondents own stocks/inventories. This 
highest percentage is explained by the tendency of cash crop traders to store crops 
they collect under arrangement of collateral management to stand as security.  Most 
crop traders particularly farmer groups prefer this mode as it enables                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
them to have   maximum loans without committing other assets.   
 
Furthermore about 27.5% of respondents owned both landed properties and stock 
inventories which indicate that crop traders have committed the valuable asset to 
secure their loans. About 19.6% of coffee and cotton traders committed only landed 
properties to secure their loans. About 7.8% of respondents own all mentioned assets 
such as landed properties, machines and factory as well as stocks and inventories 
committed to secure their loans. Most of these are the ones that are capable of doing 
the pre-processing of their product before selling to individuals or industries within 
or outside Tanzania borders. Overall, more coffee traders than cotton traders have 
landed property and stocks/inventory. 
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Table 4.3: Assets owned by the Coffee and Cotton Traders in the Study 
  Asset owned Coffee Cotton Total Percentage 
  Landed properties 9 1 10 19.6 
  Machinery and factory 1 0 1 2.0 
  Stocks / inventories 17 4 21 41.2 
  Landed properties and 
stock inventories 
12 2 
14 27.5 
  Machinery and Factory and 
Stocks/Inventories 
1 0 
1 2.0 
  All mentioned assets 0 4 4 7.8 
  Total 40 11 51 100.0 
Source: Field Data (2013) 
4.2.5 Market Channels for Selling Crops 
Success in selling of cash crops especially coffee and cotton is determined by the 
profits made from the markets. Such success is based on competitive prices as well 
as market channels which are sometimes subjected to unfair selling price (fraud) of 
crops by some unfaithful traders who act like middleman connecting the potential 
buyers and producers. Results of the market channels used by crop traders are 
presented in table 4.4. About 78.4% of coffee and cotton traders depend on the 
market channels managed or regulated by the board of specific crops in Tanzania. 
While all coffee traders depended on cooperative unions and board of specific crop, 
only slightly less than half of the cotton traders depended on these marketing 
channels. Specifically the boards involved here are the Tanzania Cotton Board and 
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Tanzania Coffee Board. These boards are responsible for protecting the interests of 
farmers against syndication by formulating and regulating the storage, market 
channels and exportation of cotton and coffee.  
 
Table 4.4: Organizations Market Channels for Coffee and Cotton Traders 
 Market Channels Coffee Cotton Total Percentage 
 Cooperative union 5 2 7 13.7 
 Board of specific crop 35 5 40 78.4 
 Companies 0 1 1 2.0 
 Cooperative Union  and Board of 
specific group 
0 1 
1 2.0 
 Board of specific crop and 
companies 
0 2 
2 3.9 
 Total 40 11 51 100.0 
Source: Field Data (2013) 
 
Also about 13.7% of all crop traders sell their products through cooperative union 
which is the association of farmers. These ensure farmers’ welfare in different 
farming aspects including providing competitive market where by products can be 
sold at competitive prices. These unions are spatial based, and have jurisdiction 
within a particular geographical locations.   Other crop traders’ channels depend on 
both, cooperative union as well as the board of the specific crop which was 
represented by 2%. Also other crop traders’ used board of specific crop and 
companies as market channels of their crops which was represented 2%. However 
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the board of specific crop is the ultimate regulator since is under Tanzania 
government through Ministry of Agriculture. 
 
4.2.6 Size of Organization in Terms of Asset Value 
The size of organization in terms of assets value is simply the capital investment with 
respect to the facilities that the organization own or use. Table 4.5 presents the 
results. This translates to over 72.7% of all cotton traders and only 10% of all coffee 
traders have assets value of above 1 Billion shillings which include companies. Also 
about 27.5% of crop traders had assets with value between 100 Million to 1 Billion 
shillings which is explained by the most cooperatives and some farmers groups. This 
also translates to 27.3% of cotton traders and 27.5 of coffee traders. Farmer groups 
with assets value of less than 100 Million shillings is represented by 49% of 
respondents, who include AMCOS and farmers groups. This group is represented by 
coffee traders only. In other words, while all cotton traders had asset with value of  
100 million shillings and above, 62.5% of coffee traders had asset value less than 
100 million shillings. 
 
Table 4.5: Asset Value 
 Asset Value in TZS Coffee Cotton Total Percentage 
 >1 Billion  4 8 12 23.5 
 100 Million – 1 Billion 11 3 14 27.5 
 < 100 Million 25 0 25 49.0 
 Total 40 11 51 100.0 
Source: Field Data (2013) 
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4.2.7 Organization Ownership 
Normally in any organization, the pattern of ownership may include Government 
owned, private owned or joint venture to which the government and private sector 
have shares. In addition, ownership is the one to which consists of members can form 
a venture in which each member occupies shares.  
 
Table 4.6 presents ownership distribution of crop traders’ enterprises. About 66.7% 
of the enterprises were members owned, and this is common in rural areas where 
most of cotton or coffee plantations are owned by village members while 75% of 
coffee traders fall in this categories, less than half (36.4%) of cotton traders fall in the 
same category. Also about 29.4% of the respondents’ enterprises were privately 
owned (22.5% coffee and 54.5% Cotton) while 2% were government owned 
organizations. 
 
 Table 4.6: Ownership of Organization 
 Owner Coffee Cotton Total Percentage 
 Government Owned  0 1 1 2.0 
 Privately Owned 9 6 15 29.4 
 Members owned 30 4 34 66.7 
 Joint Venture 1 0 1 2.0 
 Total 40 11 51 100 
Source: Field Data (2013) 
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4.2.8 Time in Operation (Age) 
Table 4.7 presents results of the time crop traders have been in operation. About 
29.4% of crop trading had been in operation more than 10 years while 54.9% 
operated between 5 and 10 years. Only 15.7% of organizations existed for Four or 
less. Table 4.7 also shows that while 95% of coffee traders are 5 or more years older, 
only 45.5% of cotton traders’ fall in the same category. This implies that more coffee 
traders were older than cotton traders. This has an important implication for loan 
repayment ability.  
 
Table 4.7: Time in Operation (Age) 
 Operation time Coffee Cotton Total Percentage 
 More than 10 years 13 2 15 29.4 
 5-10 years 25 3 28 54.9 
 0-4 years 2 6 8 15.7 
 Total 40 11 51 100.0 
Source: Field Data (2013) 
4.2.9 Education Level 
With regards to global financial crisis, the capacity of leaders of the organizations as 
well as that of its board members was critical in steering the businesses. Education 
level was used in this study to gauge the leaders’ ability to understand the different 
phenomena occurring in the course of running businesses and adapting to challenges 
in an intellectual way. Table 4.8 presents the education levels of CEO’s. About 
37.3% of organizations CEO were having primary education as their highest 
academic qualification while 35.3% were having secondary education. Only 9.8% 
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and 17.6% were college and University graduates respectively. The difference in the 
academic qualification is based on the experience in agricultural industry especially 
one involving in cotton and coffee. It is also important to note that while 63.6% of 
cotton traders’ CEOs had college education and above, only 35% of the coffee 
traders CEOs fall in that category. 
 
Table 4.8: Education Level of CEO of Organization Involved in the Study 
 Education Level Coffee Cotton Total Percentage 
 Primary education 16 3 19 37.3 
 Secondary education 17 1 18 35.3 
 College graduates 3 2 5 9.8 
 University graduates 4 5 9 17.6 
 Total 40 11 51 100.0 
 Source: Field Data (2013) 
 
In addition, education level of the Board’s chairman is presented in Table 4.9. About 
39.2% and 33.3% of organization’s board chairmen were having primary and 
secondary education as their highest academic qualification and only 17.6% and 
9.8% were college and University graduates. 
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Table 4.9: Education Level of Board Chairman  
 Education Level Coffee Cotton Total Percentage 
 Primary education 17 3 20 39.2 
 Secondary education 16 1 17 33.3 
 College graduates 6 3 9 17.6 
 University graduates 1 4 5 9.8 
 Total 40 11 51 100.0 
Source: Field Data (2013) 
 
Similarly, it is noted that while 63.6% of cotton traders had board chairman with 
college education and above, only 17.5% of coffee traders had board chairman with 
college and above education. Again these results have important implication for how 
the organization are managed and steered over efforts of the GFC storm. 
4.3 Performance of Rescue Package Beneficiaries 
Crop traders (Coffee and Cotton) are amongst the organizations which received 
funds after GFC to prompt their financial well being. Mostly the package was aimed 
at ensuring food security by enhancing traders continue producing and trading 
following the crisis. Another reason was to protect the key investments from 
collapsing which provided employment opportunity to individuals and also 
contributed to per capital income through revenue. Although the rescue package was 
given to production companies, individuals or firms that qualified the criteria set by 
the BOT, not all performed in the market and continued to survive by surviving as 
business entities. This study used different performance measures to assess these 
rescue package beneficiaries. The performance measures used included the loan 
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repayment performance (especially timely repayment status, number of loan cycles) 
and increase in sales turnover after receiving the rescue packages. Furthermore, 
percentage increase in number of staffs/members in the organization, increase in 
percentage organization’s assets and present business status were also used. 
4.3.1 Repayment Performance 
The loan repayment performance of crop traders was examined to find out how these 
traders performed after receiving the rescue package. Results are presented in Table 
4.10. About 35.37% of traders indicated that they were able to repay partially and 
late. Another 15.7% of crop traders did not pay the loans at all while another 17.6% 
paid timely but partially. This left 19.6% who repaid fully albeit late and 11.8% who 
paid fully and timely. Thus in total only 31.4% of crop traders were able to repay the 
loans fully. But also the results show that while 40% of coffee traders repaid fully, 
only 18.18% of cotton traders repaid fully and late. Thus in terms of loan repayment, 
cotton traders performed rather poorly compared to coffee traders. These results 
could explain the poor performance of CRDB’s agriculture loan portfolio.  
 
 Table 4.10: Loan Repayment Performance  
 Loan repayment 
performance 
Coffee Cotton Total Percentage 
 Fully and timely repayment 6 0 6 11.8 
 Timely but partially 
repayment 
9 0 9 17.6 
 Late but full repayment 8 2 10 19.6 
 Late and partial repayment 13 5 18 35.3 
 Not paid at all 4 4 
8 15.7 
 Total 40 11 51 100.0 
Source: Field Data (2013) 
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4.3.2 Loan Cycles  
Another objective of the rescue package was to enable crop traders repay the loans 
they had in order to continue enjoying credit from banks, in this case, CRDB Bank 
such continuation of access to credit was expected to ensure that crop traders 
continued to support agricultural production and wellbeing of farmers during crisis. 
Thus, this study sought to find out the extent to which the crop traders continued to 
access credit from CRDB Bank. Table 4.11 presents the results. A total of 64.7% 
(including 45.1% four times and 19.6% three times) of crop traders had three or more 
loan cycles since receiving the rescue packages.  
 
This indicates that following the rescue package most traders were able to take more 
credit. It is important to note that while 77.5% of coffee traders were able to take 
loans three or more times after receiving the rescue package payment only 18.2% of 
cotton traders did the same. Thus cotton traders were more able to take subsequent 
loans than their counterparts. However 11.8% of traders in the study did not take 
further loans at all. This could imply that they stopped operations. Other crop traders 
accessed credit once (9.8%) and twice (13.7%) 
 
Table 4.11: Loan Cycles  
 Loan Cycles Coffee Cotton Total Percentage 
 Four more times 21 2 23 45.1 
 Three  10 0 10 19.6 
 twice 4 3 7 13.7 
 Only once 2 3 5 9.8 
 Not at all 3 3 6 11.8 
 Total 40 11 51 100.0 
Source: Field Data (2013) 
 31 
 
 
4.3.3 Sales Turnover Status  
Another key performance indicator was changes in sales turnover. It was expected 
that following the receipt of the rescue package, crop traders would grow their sales, 
which in turn would improve their cash flows and hence ability to service the loans 
they had with CRDB Bank.  
 
Table 4.12 shows the distribution of traders across different categories of percentage 
changes in sales turnover. About 47.1% of crop traders experienced no change in 
sales turnover. Only 37.2% of crop traders in the study (7.8% traders that raise their 
sales turnover between 76% - 100%, 13.7% which raise their sales between 51%-
75% and 15.7% crop traders who raise the sales by only 26% to 50%) experienced 
some increases in sales turnover by between 26% and 100%. While 22.5% of coffee 
traders raised their sales turnover by over 50%, only 18.2% of cotton traders did so. 
 
Table 4.12: Percentage Increase of Sales Turnover 
 
 
 
Source: Field Data (2013) 
 Percentage increase Coffee  Cotton Total Percentage 
 76%-100% 4 0 4 7.8 
 51%-75% 5 2 7 13.7 
 26%-50% 7 1 8 15.7 
 1%-25% 6 2 8 15.7 
 No increase 18 6 24 47.1 
 Total 40 11 51 100.0 
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4.3.4 Percentage Increase in Staffing 
Performance of the crops traders were also analyzed based on the percentage 
increase in the number of staffs that are recruited annually consistent with one of the 
purposes of the rescue package which was to secure jobs and create new ones. Table 
4.13 presents the results. While 39.2% of crop traders were able to increase staffing 
by between 1% and 100% (with only 4% in the above 50% increase category), the 
remaining 60.8% experienced no increase in staffing i.e. 55% of coffee traders and 
81.8% of cotton traders. 
 
Table 4.13: Percentage Increase in Staffing 
 % increase in staff Coffee Cotton Total Percentage 
 76%-100% 0 1 1 2.0 
 51%-75% 1 0 1 2.0 
 26%-50% 9 0 9 17.6 
 1%-25 8 1 9 17.6 
 No increase 22 9 31 60.8 
 Total 40 11 51 100.0 
 
Source: Field Data (2013) 
4.3.5 Increase in Assets 
In addition to being able to repay their loans and stay in business, the rescue package 
beneficiaries were also expected to grow their assets. The growth in assets was also 
expected to make the crop traders able to secure subsequent loans on their own. 
Therefore, this study also assessed whether the crop traders experienced growth in 
their assets after they had benefited from the rescue package payments. Table 4.14 
presents the results.  
 33 
 
 
Table 4.14: Percentage Increase in Assets 
 % increase in Assets Coffee Cotton Total Percentage 
 76%-100% 0 0 0 0 
 51%-75% 4 1 5 9.8 
 26%-50% 2 0 2 3.9 
 1%-25 15 2 17 33.3 
 No increase 19 8 27 53.0 
 Total 40 11 51 100.0 
Source: Field Data (2013) 
 
The majority (53%) of the crop traders did not experience increases in assets. This 
leaves only 47% who experienced between 1% and 75% increase. However, the 
majority in this category falls in 1% to 25% category (33.3%). This means that the 
rescue packages only sealed the gap in trading activities of cotton and coffee traders 
which were impacted by GFC but didn’t boost their assets. The higher percentage of 
performers  in the 1 to 25% increase in assets explain the current situation in which 
the organizations are still adapting to damages they experienced in their financial 
wellbeing after the GFC. 
 
4.3.6 Business Continuity 
Globally many businesses, firms and banks entities collapsed after the GFC as they 
couldn’t cope with the financial turmoil. However, after sometimes when the 
appropriate measures were taken which among others included the provision of 
rescue packages, companies were resurrected into operations. The study therefore 
looked into persistence of the firms and companies trading cotton and coffee in the 
crop business in comparison to the way they operate before receiving rescue package 
as well as GFC. Table 4.15 presents the results. The study found out that about 
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74.5% of organizations trading coffee and cotton continued with trading in the same 
after receiving the rescue packages while 25.5% of traders collapsed. About 82.5% 
of coffee traders continued to do business while only 45.5% of cotton traders did the 
same. Higher percentage of crop traders that are still in business explains the 
effectiveness of the rescue package as it saved the larger percentage of crop traders 
from collapsing. This could imply that the firms failed to the conditions that relates 
to monetary management so that they remains in the crop business. 
 
Table 4.15: Business Continuity 
 Business Continuity Coffee Cotton Total Percentage 
 Yes 33 5 38 74.5 
 No 7 6 13 25.5 
 Total 40 11 51 100.0 
Source: Field Data (2013) 
4.4 Factors Influencing Loan Servicing After Receiving Rescue Package 
As it has been observed in the study, some of the cotton and coffee traders prove to 
exist in the crop trading business and manage to adapt with the financial crisis 
especially after receiving the stimulus package from BOT. On the other hand some 
of the crop traders, although received the rescue package didn’t recover from 
financial turmoil. 
 
Mean scores for each statement of factor were computed across all respondents. 
These mean scores were then compared statistically between mean scores for coffee 
traders and cotton traders using independent samples t-test technique. Results are 
presented in Table 4.16 Several factors were put before the rescue package 
beneficiaries and asked to agree or disagree to them in a 5 point Likert Scale. Factors 
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suggested were crop prices, interest rates, owned assets, political interference, 
availability and performances of crop markets, loan size, experience in business, 
sales turnovers and multiple borrowing. Table 4.16 presents the results and compares 
mean scores of coffee traders to those of cotton traders. 
 
Table 4.16: Factors Influencing Loan Repayment 
Factors N Coffee Cotton Total t-test 
p-value 
Price of Crops in world 
market 
51 1.38 1.00 1.29 0.014* 
Interest Rate 51 3.02 2.82 2.98 0.673 
Owned assets 51 2.42 2.45 2.43 0.955 
Political interference 51 3.82 1.73 3.37 0.000** 
Crop Markets 51 1.55 1.09 1.45 0.020* 
Loan Size 51 2.92 2.55 2.84 0.389 
Experience in Business 50 2.56 2.09 2.46 0.431 
Sales Turnover 50 1.64 1.32 1.58 0.509 
Multiple Borrowing 51 3.68 2.55 3.43 0.070 
*Significant at 0.05 level ** significant at 0.01 level                            
Source: Field Data (2013) 
 
Results shows that multiple borrowing had the highest mean score (3.43) and was 
significantly higher for coffee traders (3.68) than cotton traders (2.55) at 0.10 level. 
This was followed by political interference with mean score of (3.37) that was also 
significantly higher for coffee traders (3.82) than for cotton traders (1.73) at 0.01 
level (P<0.01). Other important factors were interest rates (2.98) and loan size (2.84) 
but there were not significantly differences in the means between coffee and cotton, 
important to note that although price of crops and crop markets had smaller mean 
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scores of 1.29 and 1.45 respectively their mean scores for coffee traders were 
significantly higher than those of cotton traders at 0.05 level. 
 
 4.5. Factors Influencing Access to Loans after Receiving Rescue Package 
Factors which influenced crop traders to continue accessing loan from CRDB bank 
after receiving rescue package were determined out of few suggested to them. They 
were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree / disagree to each of the 
suggested factor in a 5-point Likert scale. The suggested factors included traders’ 
credit history, collaterals, bank policies, bank procedures, traders’ relationship with 
the bank and timeliness of disbursements of the rescue package payment. Mean 
scores across respondents for each factor were computed and compared between 
coffee and cotton traders using independent sample t-test technique. Results are 
presented in Table 4.17  
 
Table 4.17: Factors Influencing Access to Loans 
Factors N Coffee Cotton Total t-test 
p -value 
Traders’ credit History 50 1.18 1.00 1.14 0.391 
Collaterals 50 1.51 1.64 1.54 0.702 
Bank Policies 49 2.13 2.82 2.29 0.126 
Bank Procedures 49 2.32 3.27 2.53 0.087 
Traders’ Relationship with the 
bank 
49 1.41 1.00 1.33 0.002** 
Timeliness of disbursement 49 2.31 2.50 2.35 0.723 
** Significant at 0.01 level 
Source: Field Data (2013)                      
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The results show that bank procedures topped the list with a mean score of 2.53 
where the means score for coffee traders (2.32) was significantly lower than the 
mean score for cotton traders (3.27) (p=0.087). This was followed by timeliness in 
disbursing the rescue package payment with mean score 2.35. The mean score for 
coffee traders (2.31) was not statistically significantly different from that of cotton 
traders (2.50).  
 
Bank policies were also viewed as an important factor (2.29) where the mean score 
for coffee traders (2.13) was lower than that of cotton traders (2.82) but the 
difference is not statistically significantly. Although the traders’ relationship with the 
bank was ranked low (1.33), the mean score for coffee traders (1.410 was 
significantly higher that of cotton traders (1.00) at 0.01 level (p=0.002). Overall most 
of the factors are from the bank’s side rather than from the customer or crop business 
per se. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMENDATIONS 
5.1 Overview 
The objective of the study wasto assess the performance of the beneficiries of the 
rescue package payment and aidentify the determinants of such performance. 
Seventy four (74) questionnaires were distributed out of which 51 returned and were 
found useful for analysis. These included 40 from coffee traders and 11 from cotten 
traders scattered in Mwanza, Shinyanga, Mara, Mbeya and Ruvuma. Cross tabulation 
and independent sample t-test of means techniques were used for data analyis. 
 
5.2 Summary of the Key Findings 
The study reveals although the rescue package was given to all cotton and coffee 
traders meet the required criteria but not all the recipients perform better in loan 
servicing as expected. Results show that 31.3% of the rescue package beneficiaries 
repaid their loans fully, 78.4% accessed loans subsequently; 52.9% experienced 
increase in sales varying from 1% to 100%, 39.2% increased staffing by between 1% 
to 100%; and 74.5% were able to survive and continue trade in the two crops. There 
were notable differences in all performance measurements between coffee and cotton 
traders.  
 
Multiple borrowing behaviour of the traders, political interference, interest rate on 
loans and crop market were found to be important determinants of rescue package 
beneficiaries’ subsequently loan repayment performance. Mean scores for multiple 
borrowing and political interference for coffee traders were statistically significantly 
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higher than those of cotton traders. Moreover, although crop prices and crop markets 
had the lowest mean scores, those for coffee traders were statistically higher than 
those of cotton traders and were significant. 
 
Result also show that bank procedures, timeliness disbursement, bank policies, 
timeliness of disbursement of rescue package payments and traders relationship with 
the bank were important factors for subsequent access to loans. Mean scores for all 
these factors were lower and statistically insignificant for coffee traders except for 
the traders’ relationship with the bank in which the mean score for coffee traders was 
significantly higher than that of cotton traders.  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
Although only a third of the beneficiaries were able to repay the loans fully, notable 
progress is recorded. Over three quarters accessed loans subsequently over half 
increased sales by between 1 and 100%. Over 74.5% survived and continued with 
businesses. It can therefore be concluded that there were some notable improvements 
in the performance of beneficiaries after receiving the package. 
 
Multiple borrowing behaviour of the beneficiaries on the one hand and political 
interference on the other were critical factors in influencing loan repayment 
performance. Bank policies, procedures and timeliness in disbursing the package 
were important factors influencing subsequent access to loans after receiving the 
rescue package. Since all these are within the bank’s territory, it can be concluded 
that subsequent access to loans were affected by bank’s policies and procedures 
rather than failure of the beneficiaries to utilizing the package. 
 40 
 
 
It can also be concluded that the factors so identified influenced the beneficiaries 
ability to repay differently depending on the crop been dealt with i.e. coffee or cotton 
traders more affected. Similarly factors affecting access to loans affected the 
beneficiaries differently with cotton traders less affected compared to coffee traders. 
 
5.4 Implication of Study Results 
The results simply that the decision of the Government to provide rescue package to 
crop traders it is a plausible measure despite the challenges it comes with. If the 
similar situation happens, there is a need to have a level playing field to ensure that 
crop traders are treated equally and fairly. Bank policies and procedure, practices 
may have a higher impact on customers’ ability and willingness to access loans. Also 
multiple borrowing has high impact on loans’ performance since it becomes source 
of credit risk. 
 
Recommendations 
The rescue package has highlighted the commitment and willingness of the 
Government to assist the affected crop traders during global financial crisis but also 
other plausible measure should put in place in case the situations similar to this 
happen.Banks should take critical measures to review frequently their policies and 
procedures to make them friendly to customers without necessarily creating undue 
risk exposures. Crop traders should consider selecting the qualified Board Chairmen 
as well as Chief Executive Officers for critical analysis of their  business 
performance. Political interference should be kept at minimum to allow crop traders 
to perform their business for the purpose of getting profit and repay their outstanding 
loans from commercial banks. 
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5.6 Limitations and Area for Future Studies 
Limitations 
The study was limited to crop traders associated with one bank only and therefore, 
the findings may not be generalizes to all banks. Also it is known that the rescue 
package covered more than just coffee and cotton traders. Since the evidence 
presented here is only for coffee and cotton traders, it may not be generalizable 
across all the affected crops. 
Area for Future Studies 
Therefore further studies are recommended to include other participating bank and 
businesses. Further studies may also compare performance of other traders who were 
trading in the same business at the time but did not access the rescue. Considering 
these groups concurrently provides a fertile avenue for controlling the impact of the 
general movements in the market which may bias the performance recovered here.  
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APPENDICES 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Dear respondent, 
This questionnaire is administered by a Master Degree Programme student of Open 
University of Tanzania, as part of his research for the partial fulfilment for the award 
of Master Degree Programme. The research is examining ‘Performance of Rescue 
Packages Beneficiaries and its determinants’: The case of CRDB Bank PLC. 
The aim is to find key characteristics affecting your loan performance after you 
received rescue package. Your responses are important in gathering information in 
better understanding the scope of the study.  
 
The questionnaire has three parts which should take you about ten minutes to 
complete. Please tick the appropriate provided box. If you wish to add further 
comments, please feel free to do so. The provided information will be treated with 
high confidentiality. That’s why you haven’t asked to include your name or address 
anywhere on the questionnaire. The answers from your questionnaires will be used as 
the main source of data for this research for my Master degree in Business 
Administration at the Open University of Tanzania. 
 
I hope that you will enjoy responding on provided questions. I kindly request you to 
answer the questions that appear in this questionnaire by filling in the answers briefly 
and appropriately. 
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God bless you for devoting your time to fill in this questionnaire. 
Yours Faithful, 
Makoye Luswaga (Email. makoyeluswaga@gmail.com Tel: 0754-487382) 
MBA Student
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PART ONE – CHARACTERISTICS 
You have given questions 1-18, please tick (√) the appropriate box  
 
1. In which region do you operating from?  
S/N Region Tick (√) 
1 Mbeya  
2 Mwanza  
3 Ruvuma  
4 Shinyanga  
5 Mara  
 
 
2. Which crop do you deal with? 
 S/N Crop Tick (√) 
1 Coffee  
2 Cotton  
 
 
3. Which assets do your organization own? 
S/N Assets owned Tick (√) 
1 Landed properties  
2 Machinery and Factory  
3 Chattels  
4 Stocks / inventories  
5 Other specify  
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4. To which markets channel do you sell your crops? 
S/N Market Tick (√) 
1 Individuals  
2 AMCOS  
3 Cooperative Union  
4 Board of specific crop  
5 Companies  
6 Other specify  
 
5. What is the size of your organization in terms of asset value? 
S/N Assets value in TZS Tick (√) 
1 Above 1 Billion  
2 100Mn to 1 Billion  
3 Less than  100 Million  
 
6. How is your organization owned? 
S/N Organization ownership Tick (√) 
1 Government owned  
2 Privately owned  
3  Members owned  
 
7. How long has your organization been in operation? 
S/N Age of an organization Tick (√) 
1 More than 10 years  
2 5-10 years  
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S/N Age of an organization Tick (√) 
3 0-4 years  
 
8. What is the highest level of education of your CEO? 
S/N Level of Education  Tick (√) 
1 Primary Education  
2 Secondary Education  
3 College Graduates  
4 University graduate  
 
9. What is the average level of education of your Board Chairman? 
 S/N Level of Education  Tick (√) 
1 Primary Education  
2 Secondary Education  
3 College Graduates  
4 University graduate  
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PART TWO-PERFOMANCE MEASURES 
 
10. What was your organization subsequent loan repayment performance after 
receiving the rescue package funds? 
S/N Loan repayment performance Tick (√) 
1 Full and timely repayment   
2 Timely but partial repayment  
3 Late but Full repayment  
4 Late and partial repayment  
5 Not paid  at all  
 
11. How many loans cycles did your organization take after receiving the rescue 
package funds? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. To what extent did your organization sales turnover increased after receiving 
the rescue package funds? 
 
 
 
 
 
S/N Loans cycles Tick (√) 
1 Four more Times  
2 Three  times   
3 Two  times  
4 Only once  
5 Not  at all  
S/N Increase in Sales turnover Tick (√) 
1 More than 100%  
2 76% -  100%   
3 51% -  75%  
4 26% - 50%  
5 1% - 25%  
6 No increase  
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13. What was the percentage increase in the number of staff for your organization 
after receiving rescue package funds? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. What was the percentage increase in your organization’s assets subsequent to 
receiving rescue package funds? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15. Is your organization still in business of crop trading after receiving rescue 
package funds? 
 
 
 
S/N Staff increase Tick (√) 
1 More than 100%  
2 76% -  100%   
3 51% -  75%  
4 26% - 50%  
5 1% - 25%  
6 No increase  
S/N Assets increase Tick (√) 
1 More than 100%  
2 76% -  100%   
3 51% -  75%  
4 26% - 50%  
5 1% - 25%  
6 No increase  
S/N Business existing Tick (√) 
1 Yes  
2 No   
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PART THREE  
 FACTORS 
 
16. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the mentioned statements as 
factors that influenced your loan servicing to CRDB after receiving the rescue 
package funds? Please tick (√) the appropriate column that matches the view 
most closely represents your opinion. 
S/N Factors Strong 
agree 
Tend 
to 
agree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Tend to 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
1 Price of crops in world 
market affected my ability 
to service the loan from 
CRDB. 
     
2 Interest rate affected my 
ability to service the loan 
from CRDB  
     
3 Owned assets affected my 
ability to service the loan 
from CRDB 
     
4 Political interference 
affected my ability to 
service the loan from 
CRDB 
     
5 Crop markets affected my 
ability to service the loan 
from CRDB. 
     
 57 
 
 
 
Other specify………………………………………………………………………. 
.............................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Loan Size affected my 
ability to service the loan 
from CRDB. 
     
7 My experience in business 
affected my ability to 
service the loan from 
CRDB 
     
8 Sales turnover affected my 
ability to service the loan 
from CRDB. 
     
9 Multiple borrowing 
affected my ability to 
service the  loan from 
CRDB 
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17. To what extent do you agree with the mentioned statements as factors that 
influenced you to continue accessing loan From CRDB after receiving rescue 
package funds? Please tick (√) the appropriate column that matches the view 
most closely represents your opinion. 
S/N Factors Strong 
agree 
Tend 
to 
agree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Tend to 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
1 My credit History 
influenced my ability 
to access loan from 
CRDB 
     
2  Collaterals influenced 
my ability to access 
loan from CRDB 
     
3 Bank policies  
influenced me  to 
access loan from 
CRDB 
     
4 Bank  procedures 
influenced me  to 
access loan from 
CRDB 
     
5 My relationship with 
the bank was 
favourable 
     
6 Timely  disbursements 
influenced me to 
access loan from 
CRDB 
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